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Abstract. The term visual reasoning, in cogmnve psychology, often
refers to the use of visual spatial relations in making inferences about
corresponding conceptual relations. The conclusion is that external visual
representations have special properties, which can aid reasoning about
higher order abstract concepts. The design literature is more specific and
often sees visual reasoning as synonymous with drawing, and considers
this a core activity in resolving design problems. The research to be
reported examined visual reasoning and design, by investigating the role
that drawing plays in the practicality and creativity of inventions. The
most striking finding was that using only mental imagery produced more
creative and practical inventions than the use of drawing and that this was
dependant on the area of expertise of the participants. This appears to run
counter to the views found in both the visual reasoning and design
literature regarding the effectiveness of visual representations and
drawing. This has implications for our understanding of both the visual
reasoning and design thinking processes.
1. Introduction
Design is a problem solving activity, and like all such activities requires
reasoning. Literature concerning the design reasoning process (for example see
Do and Gross (1996)) discusses the reliance, by designers, on the use of
drawing to aid conceptualisations and design reasoning. As drawing is a visual
medium, design reasoning can be considered synonymous with visual reasoning
in that designers may use drawing as a vehicle for reasoning. Drawing is
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considered by Herbert (1993) to be a designer's principle means of thinking. In
a sense the views of the design literature parallel the views of the cognitive
psychology literature concerned with visual reasoning. Essentially the cognitive
psychology literature (for example see Gattis and Holyoak (1996)) views visual
reasoning as the use of visual spatial relations in making inferences about
corresponding conceptual relations, concluding that external visual
representations have special properties which can aid reasoning about higher
order abstract concepts. The parallel rests in the notion that the design process
is seen as one in which designers visually reason internally via mental imagery,
then draw generating external representations of that imagery, reflect and
reason about the external imagery, then draw again. This symbiotic relationship
between the internal visual imagery and the external visual imagery to reason to
a solution is seen as a systematic dialectic between the two modes of reasoning
(see Goldschmidt (1991)). The problems designers reason through to resolution
are generally ill defined, which generally means there is more than one way in
which to resolve the problem. Hence creativity in solution development plays
as much a part in the design thinking process as the reasoning process. The act
of invention typifies this creative yet reasoned approach to problem solving.
However, in the main the visual reasoning research found in the cognitive
psychology literature empirically investigates well-defined problems, which
have one solution (i.e. solving a physics problem).
Research concerning visual reasoning found in the cognitive psychology
literature largely uses empirical methods; conversely the design research
literature tends to contain anecdotal evidence which is largely based on
designer's thinking and speculating about the design process on the basis of
their own experiences. While the initial reason for the research to be presented
was to investigate issues revolving around creative mental synthesis and
drawing, it is no less important to the visual reasoning research in that it
empirically examines the role of drawing in creating and developing practical
inventions. As the act of inventing involves creativity and reasoning about
spatial relationships, resulting in three-dimensional artefacts, which serve some
purpose, it directly relates to both the design and visual reasoning research.
2. Cognitive Perspective
The cognitive research focusing on visual reasoning (see for example, Gattis
and Holyoak (1996); Larkin and Simon (1987); Larkin (1983); Tabachneck et.
al. (1994); Kindfield (1992) Anazi and Yokoyama (1984)) has some common
themes. Whether the authors are writing about resolving physics problems,
economics problems, or biology problems the overarching theme is that
diagrams can, and often do, play a significant role in reasoning through
problems. Across these quite varied domains, in general, the problem solvers
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the end of the time period they were instructed to open their eyes and write
down the name of the practical object, then draw it and then describe it.
2.1. THE ROLE OF DRAWING IN INVENTION
While the creative mental synthesis research above has a drawing component,
drawing is not seen as an aid in the development of either the recognizable
forms or the practical inventions. However, the research of Anderson and
Helstrup (1993) had investigated whether allowing subjects to draw while they
were performing the task, affected performance. It was argued that developing
an object by performing this task mentally might involve a high cognitive load
and that drawing while thinking and developing a solution may lighten the
cognitive load by externally representing the form being worked with. In order
to test the importance of drawing in creative mental synthesis Anderson and
Helstrup (1993) conducted experiments modelled after Finke and Slayton
(1988). The subjects, in Anderson and Helstrup (1993), in some trials were
encouraged to draw while developing their forms, and other trials they were
instructed to develop the forms only mentally. Anderson and Helstrup (1993)
found no difference between using only internal visual imagery and using
external visual imagery (that is drawing with pencil and paper) as support for
generating patterns of good correspondence. Additionally, there was no
difference in the number of creative patterns generated either using pencil and
paper support to develop the forms or only mentally developing the forms. This
research appears to parallel both the visual reasoning research and the design
research in that the subjects were encouraged to use drawing to develop their
ideas but the results appear to be counter to both the visual reasoning research
and design beliefs.
However, Kokotovich and Purcell (2000) argued that the Anderson and
Helstrup (1993) results did not constitute an appropriate test of the design
belief that drawing is important in creative design for two reasons. First the
participants in Anderson and Helstrup (1993) did not come from a design
background and consequently might not have the required skill in using
drawing in this way. Second the participants in their research were simply
encouraged to draw while developing their ideas without being told how to use
drawing, which does not necessarily parallel how drawing is used in design.
Kokotovich and Purcell (2000) argued the structure of the creative mental
synthesis task allows a much more careful analysis of drawing by controlling,
quite explicitly, when the drawing activity occurs while conceptualising and
developing the idea for an invention. The data they reported appeared to
demonstrate that none of the ways in which drawing could be used increased
the creativity of the inventions produced. Rather creativity was enhanced when
ideas for inventions had to be developed using only mental imagery. Further the
extent to which creativity was enhanced depended on the way in which the
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participant was presented with the problem and on whether or not the
participant was a designer and the particular design discipline involved.
The focus of Kokotovich and Purcell (2000) was on the issue of drawing
and creativity in design and their results again appear to be inconsistent with
design beliefs about creativity. The visual reasoning research has not addressed
the issue of creativity in problem solving and so it could be argued their results
are not relevant to visual reasoning. It can also be argued that being able to
produce a practical invention is relevant to visual reasoning as it can be
conceptualised as a successful resolution of the problem. In the creative mental
synthesis task, the inventions produced are judged in terms of both their
creativity and their practicality and both types of judgements were obtained as
part of the data that formed the basis of the Kokotovich and Purcell (2000)
paper on creativity and drawing. Given that practicality is closer to the usual
visual reasoning research this paper analyses the practicality data from a visual
reasoning perspective. However it can be argued that a creative solution
represents a particularly successful outcome and is consequently also relevant
to visual reasoning. This paper therefore includes the creativity data reported in
Kokotovich and Purcell (2000) to allow a comparison between the two in the
context of visual reasoning.
3. The Experiment
3.1. EXPPERIMENTAL METHODS
In order to investigate specific themes relating to how and when drawing may
be used to develop inventions, Kokotovich and Purcell (2000) developed a
series of tasks, which were divided into four distinct strategies (note in Table 1
below the different strategies (Strategies ABeD)), and two distinct phases
within each strategy (note in table 1 below Tasks 1 and 2). The participants in
the experiment were senior industrial and graphic design students representing
two different types of designer and similar senior students in law representing a
non-design group. Groups of 20 from each background participated in the
experiment.
In all the Task 1 phases their subjects completed three trials lasting three
minutes each. When completing Task 2 phases, in order to maintain
consistency between tasks, the subjects were given nine minutes to complete
the tasks. The nine minutes relates to the time allowed in the Task one phase (3
trials x 3 minutes each). In order to maximize the creative output, in all tasks
the subjects could create as many forms as they liked before the end of the time
period.
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TABLE 1. Strategy type and Task type.
Drawing Strategies and Invention
Strategy A Strategy B Strategy C Strategy D
Task! Task! Task! Task!
......-
p Using drawing to Using mental Using drawing to Mentally develop
h develop ideas imagery to develop ideas and name forms
a (time limit) develop ideas (time limit) (time limit) (no
s (time limit), then parts given),
e draw the ideas THEN parts given
(no time limit) to develop the
1 previously named
'-- forms (no time
limit)
~
p Task 2 Task 2 Task 2 Task 2
h
a Using mental
s Using drawing to Using drawing to imagery alone to
e rotate and rotate and rotate forms then Using drawing to
reinterpret forms reinterpret forms draw and rotate and
2 (time limit) (time limit) reinterpret forms reinterpret formsL....-- (time limit) (time limit)
In the first phase (task one) of Strategy A and Strategy C (see Table 1
above) the subjects were instructed to draw while they developed a practical
invention. With the exception of being told to use drawing to develop the
invention instead of closing their eyes and using only 'mental imagery', the
procedures were similar to those of Finke (1990).
In Task 2 of Strategy A, Strategy B and Strategy D (see Table 1 above),
after having completed all three trials, in Task 1, the subjects were to use
drawing to reinterpret their ideas from task one by sketching the previous fOnTIS
in new orientations. They were not allowed to reconstruct their previous
inventions, they were only to rotate, slide and/or scale all or some of the parts
of their inventions in order to reinterpret them.
In the initial phase (Task one) of Strategy B (refer to Table I above) the
subjects were instructed to develop a practical invention via 'mental imagery'
only as in Finke (1990).
In Task 2 of Strategy C (see Table 1 above), the subjects were to reinterpret
the ideas and drawings from Task 1 of Strategy C by selecting one of the ideas
then closing their eyes and mentally reinterpreting it. The instructions for
reinterpretation here, were identical to those of the other second phases in the
other strategies, with the exception they were to do this by only mentally
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manipulating the forms. If they had a reinterpretation they were to open their
eyes write the idea down, then describe and draw it.
They could repeat the procedure in order to create as many inventions as time
would allow.
Task 1 of Strategy D was divided into two parts. Initially the subjects closed
their eyes and were required to mentally develop an invention within a given
category without being given the parts. Once the subject had an idea they were
to open their eyes write it down, then if time had not run out they closed their
eyes again and were to develop another idea. Next they were given a triplet of
parts for each trial and they had to use these parts to embody their ideas, via
drawing.
Student judges (15 in total), equally represented from the three different
disciplines (Industrial designers, Visual communication designers, and Non-
designers), reviewed the resultant drawings making creativity judgments and
practicality judgments, using a scale of I to 5 (1 being the lowest and 5 being
the highest). If a majority of judges gave an invention a score of 4 or better it
was counted as creative and if a majority of judges gave an invention a score of
4 or better for practicality it was considered practical. The judges were blind to
both who developed the individual responses, and the drawing strategy
conditions as they were reviewing the randomly ordered responses. (For the
details of the experimental methods and procedures see Kokotovich and Purcell
(2000».
3.2. EXPECTATIONS OF DRAWING
In the previous section we outlined the different drawing strategies and tasks,
which were controlled in order to investigate drawing issues while the subjects
endeavoured to conceptualise and develop inventions. The following is a
discussion of the expected results of these manipulations from both a visual
reasoning and design perspective, Strategy by Strategy.
Given that both the visual reasoning literature and the design literature argue
that external visual representations (drawing) and internal conceptualisations
and reasoning are co-dependent in order to resolve visual problems, it would be
expected that both Strategy A Task l(drawing to develop ideas and solve
problems) and Strategy A task 2 (drawing to reinterpret ideas) should yield the
highest frequency of practical inventions and creative inventions. In addition,
the second tasks (Task 2) of Strategies A,B&D, based on the design literature's
arguments of emergence in drawings, should also yield a high number of
practical and creative inventions. That is in all of the conditions where drawing
was permitted there should be increases in creativity and practicality of the
inventions produced.
However, based on the findings of Anderson and Helstrup (1993) there
should be no difference in either the frequency of practical inventions or
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creative inventions when comparing Strategy A Task l(drawing to develop
ideas and solve problems) and Strategy B Task 1 (only mentally developing
ideas and solving problems). This is in direct conflict with both the visual
reasoning literature and design literature, given that both the visual reasoning
literature and the design literature argue that drawing aids internal
conceptualisations and visual reasoning. It would be a reasonable expectation
that the use of drawing to develop practical inventions in lieu of solely using
mental imagery would lead to increased numbers of practical inventions. This
is seen as plausible, given the consistency of the existing literature, which
suggests a strong symbiotic relationship between drawing, visual reasoning,
and creative mental synthesis.
In order to test the possibility that mentally reinterpreting inventions may be
as effective as drawing to develop inventions, Strategy C Task2 (mentally
reinterpreting inventions) was included. If mentally developing and
reinterpreting inventions is an equally acceptable strategy as using drawing to
reinterpret inventions, then mentally reinterpreting inventions should yield
similar frequencies of practical and creative inventions when compared to the
other Task 2 strategies.
When researching expert and novice designers, Mathias (1993) found
novice designers often use drawing to focus early on a design solution. In
contrast, experts would use drawing to generate ideas and concepts (not unlike
the views argued in the visual reasoning literature) and not form at this stage of
the process. In operating at the level of abstract ideas and concepts experts
appear to develop a complex search space opening up the possibility of
innovative and creative outcomes. In the later stages of the design process,
Mathias (1993) found that expert designers use drawing and modelling for
synthesis to embody the ideas in physical form (again quite similar to the views
argued in the visual reasoning literature). As experts tend to separate ideas from
the embodiment of ideas then use drawing to develop the ideas, an expectation
would be that increased numbers of practical ideas would be developed through
the use of drawing as an aid to the visual reasoning process. In addition,
consistent with the design literature, increased numbers of creative inventions
would be expected when using Strategy D Task 1.
3.3. DATA AND ANALYSIS
Tables 2 and 3, below, show the relationship between frequency of practical
and creative responses and various drawing strategies and tasks in tabular form.
Table 2, below, shows the frequency of creative inventions, while Table 3
shows the frequency of practical inventions. Each row represents a subject
type, and each column a Strategy/Task type, allowing comparisons and
contrasts between subject type and strategy type to be made.
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A striking result, apparent in Table 2 below, is that Strategy D Task 1
(separating ideas from the embodiment of ideas) has the greatest frequency of
creative responses (155 in total) from all subject types.
TABLE 2. Number of creative responses attributed to subject type, strategy type and task.
Drawing Strategies and Subject Types (Creativity 3D) (all judges)
Strategy A Strategy A Strategy B Strategy B Strategy C Strategy C Strategy D Strategy D




Designers 15 12 36 13 13 II 70 10 180
Vis· Com
(Students) 9 18 10 59 121
Non-designers
(Law students) 2 0 2 0 26 2 <4<1
Total
Creative 26 20 59 21 25 16 155 19 I ~1
However, in contrast Strategy D Task 1, in Table 3 below, yielded the
lowest frequency of practical responses (9 in total) from all subject types. In
one sense this is a surprising result, however, it appears to be consistent with
Mathias (1993) regarding the tendency of expert designers to separate ideas
from the embodiment of ideas, and redefine the brief. Equally surprising, in
contrast however, is the finding that this strategy of the separation of ideas
from the embodiment of ideas results in a severe drop in practical ideas.
TABLE 3. Number of practical responses attributed to subject type, strategy type and task.
Drawing Strategies and Subject Types (Practicality 3D) (all judges)
Strategy A Strategy A Strategy B Strategy B Strategy C Strategy C Strategy D Strategy D




Designers 10 12 40 17 14 12 6 19 130
Vis- Com
(Students) II 9 11 6 5 12 2 10 66
Non-designers
(Law students) 4 12 18 13 6S
Total
Practical 25 26 63 28 37 37 9 36 161
In addition, it is clear, in Tables 2 and 3 above, the overall totals for Strategy B
Task 1 (Mentally developing inventions) were more than double those of
Strategy A Task 1 (Drawing to develop inventions) in terms of both practicality
and creativity. When comparing the frequencies of creative inventions in Table
2, Strategy B Task 1 had a total of 59 creative inventions, were as a total 26
creative inventions were developed using Strategy A Task 1. In Table 3, in
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terms of the frequency of practical inventions, Strategy B Task 1 totalled 63,
were as there was a total of 25 practical inventions developed using Strategy A
Task 1 (Drawing to develop inventions).
While visual reasoning is considered a generalized activity, by virtue of
their training in the use of drawing for the conceptualisation and development
of solutions to three-dimensional problems, the industrial designer, in
particular, could be expected to have increased frequencies of creative and
practical inventions when using Strategy A Task 1 (Drawing to develop
inventions). However, this was not the case. As shown in Table 2 above, the
Industrial designers were able to develop two and one half times more creative
inventions when using Strategy B Task I (Mentally developing inventions) a
total of 36, in contrast to Strategy A Task 1 (Drawing to develop inventions) a
total of 15 creative inventions. When reviewing the frequencies of practical
inventions generated by the industrial designers, in Table 3 above, they were
the only group able to develop a four-fold increase in practical inventions when
using Strategy B Task 1 (Mentally developing inventions) a total of 40, in
contrast to Strategy A Task 1 (Drawing to develop inventions) a total of 10
practical inventions.
In general, given the frequencies of Strategy A Task 1 and Task 2, in Tables
2 and 3 above, when either using drawing as an aid in developing inventions
(Task 1) or reinterpreting inventions (Task 2), the frequencies of practical
inventions and creative inventions remain relatively low. Given the views of
both the visual reasoning and design literature regarding the co dependence of
internal conceptualisations and external representations (drawing) in the
resolution of problems, these findings appear to run counter to the expectations
discussed earlier. The use of drawing should have aided invention
conceptualisation and development.
4. Conclusion
As discussed earlier, a common theme running though both the visual reasoning
literature and the design literature is that the act of drawing aids
conceptualisation and reasoning. Other literature (see Anderson and Helstrup
(1993)) suggested the act of drawing is of little consequence. However, as we
discussed earlier, in their work, they did not use subjects from a design
background, who are trained in how to use drawings to solve problems. In
addition, their subjects were not instructed in how to use drawing to resolve the
problems. In Anderson and Helstrup (1993), the subjects were merely told to
'doodle' .
Contrary to expectations discussed earlier, and the views of both the visual
reasoning and design literature, the results of this study reveal that mentally
conceptualising and developing inventions is more effective than using drawing
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as an aid. The data, described earlier, revealed that when using only mental
imagery to develop ideas, then using drawing to embody those ideas (as in
Strategy D Task 1), substantial increases in creative invention can and does
occur.
Further support in using only mental imagery to conceptualise and develop
inventions can be demonstrated by the fact that 3D designers using Strategy B
Task 1 (mentally developing inventions) were able to quadruple the number
practical inventions, compared to when they used Strategy A Task 1 (Drawing
to develop inventions). In addition they were able to more than double the
frequency of creative inventions by only mentally developing their inventions,
as opposed to using drawing to develop their inventions. From a visual
reasoning perspective, it is possible that mental imagery is being used to access
conceptual knowledge that is important and relevant. That is to say the subjects
may be visually reasoning in the mind rather than externally via drawings.
Therefore, we conclude that mental imagery and mental modelling ('running'
and 'playing with' the inventions in the mind) is more potent than generally
given credit, at least for 3D designers.
When reviewing the results of Task 2 (Drawing to reinterpret inventions), it
can be argued that the subjects were limited or constrained in their emergent
inventions. They were not allowed to reconstruct their previous inventions,
they were only to rotate, slide and/or scale all or some of the parts of their
inventions in order to reinterpret them. Designers are thought to reconstruct or
even add and subtract parts to their ideas. Our subjects were restricted in that
they were not allowed to do this. Hence, it can be argued we limited their
ability to invent. This notwithstanding, the subjects were, in Strategy A task 1,
given the freedom to reconstruct their inventions. Therefore, we would argue
that increased numbers of creative and practical inventions should have
occurred when contrasting Strategy A Task 1 (Drawing to develop inventions)
with Strategy A Task 2 (Drawing to reinterpret inventions). The increase did
not occur.
These findings appear to run counter to the results of Verstijnen (1997),
who also investigated creative mental synthesis and invention using designers
and non-designers as subjects. However, it must be remembered that the central
issues of her correlation studies, revolved around creativity, drawing, synthesis,
and analysis. She differentiated synthesis and analysis by describing synthesis
as a figural combination task, and analysis as restructuring with an expectation
of emergent forms, linking these to drawing and non-drawing conditions to
develop ideas. In addition, for purposes of consistency with respect to
Anderson and Helstrup (1993), our work, in contrast to hers, required all the
subjects to experience all drawing conditions.
The comparisons made in Verstijnen (1997) between designers and non-
designers, in terms of creativity were correlated with synthesis and analysis
ratings suggesting that drawing aids analysis, thereby leading to creative
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outcomes. Therefore, in relation to our study it should be expected that Strategy
A Task 2 (drawing to reinterpret) should yield increased numbers of creative
inventions, in contrast to Strategy B Task 1 (mentally developing inventions).
This increase did not occur in our work. Alternatively, the possibility exists that
drawing for analysis (reinterpreting), may aid in developing practical
inventions, this was not teased out of her data. In our data, as indicated earlier,
mentally developing inventions, as in Strategy B Task 1, leads to increased
practical inventions, in contrast to Strategy A task 2 (drawing to reinterpret
inventions).
As our study used elements and tasks close to those a 3D designer would be
accustomed to resolving, the 3D designers would be expected to produce
outcomes similar to industrial design solutions (innovative and practical). This
is part of the reason for the choice of the participants. This research specifically
sought to stay close to Finke and Slayton (1988) and Finke (1990). This in tum
leads to the work of Anderson and Helstrup (1993) with respect to drawing
issues. If we went straight to a design task without doing these experiments, it
could be argued that the research and research methods are not related to their
work, therefore, we would lose the connection. Given the Finke (1990) tasks
and the groups used, there is a sense in which the things they are manipulating
in the task have a relationship to the designers. However, the next logical step
is to, in some way, develop the Finke and Slayton (1988) and Finke (1990)
tasks into a fully-fledged design task and then examine it, thus moving even
closer to design issues.
Acknowledging that the tasks, while very similar to design problems, are not
exactly design problems, does not diminish the results obtained. In fact while
few in number there is some support within both the visual reasoning literature
and the design literature suggesting that using mental imagery is more potent
than generally revealed. In a sense our findings are not entirely unexpected. In a
protocol study Athavankar (1995) blindfolded expert designers, and directed
them to evolve their designs exclusively using mental imagery. He suggested
there is some evidence to support the view that designers are able to mentally
model their designs and with natural ease 'play with it' to resolve design
problems. In addition some of his subjects suggested that they were in fact
more fluent with ideas and enjoyed working this way (blindfolded).
Within the visual reasoning research there is also some evidence that using
only mental imagery, in some instances, is an effective strategy, and perhaps
more effective than using drawing. Some theoretical accounts describe the
process of inferring the operation of a physical device as envisioning or
'running' a mental model (For example see: de Kleer and Brown (1984);
Reiger and Grinsberg (1977); Williams et al (1983); Thurstone (1950». It is
possible the designers in this study are mentally modelling their inventions
rather than externally representing them (drawing). This, however, appears to
be reliant on mental visual spatial abilities. In Gattis and Holyoak (1996) the
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subjects are thought to be 'chunking' visual information to highlight conceptual
information. Drawing is thought to aid this process to enable the testing of
potential conclusions, based on mental models, to verify if each possible mental
model is consistent with the constraints placed on a system. Yet, in an ill-
defined problem, like a design problem, the constraints often change. As
indicated earlier, designers often define and redefine problems {i.e. act as
problem setters} (for example see Mathias (1993)) in addition to solving
problems {i.e. acting as problem solvers}. If the design and constraints of the
inventions are continually in a state of rapid change, the mental models need to
rapidly change as well. The act of drawing may not facilitate the mental
conceptualisations and developments. It is possible that designers are able to
more readily, 'run' or 'play with' these mental models of their inventions due
to their mental visual spatial abilities. That is to say the experienced 3D
designers may be visually reasoning internally via the mental models, rather
than externally via drawings.
Given the discussion above, 'running' or 'playing with' mental models
seems to require mental animation abilities as well as visual spatial abilities in
order to visually reason though problems concerning inventions. Often
inventions result in a three-dimensional object, which solves a problem.
Sometimes these inventions have mechanisms (i.e. parts which move). In order
to develop these movable inventions and model how they might work, mental
animations may need to occur to test run the inventions to make sure they are
practical. In their visual reasoning research, investigating mental animation and
mechanical reasoning, Hegarty and Sims (1994) argued mental animation was
another cognitive component of mechanical ability. In addition, they argued
mental animation in a mechanical visual reasoning task was linked to visual
spatial ability. They used low spatial ability and high spatial ability subjects,
which were drawn from a general psychology class. Their subjects were to
mentally animate mechanical devices (as inventions sometimes have). Errors of
understanding, with respect to the motion of the mechanisms, were counted.
Hegarty and Sims (1994) had shown only the low spatial ability subjects had
increased errors the further down the causal chain in a mechanical problem
they progressed. The high spatial ability subjects were largely successful in the
mental animation, mechanical reasoning task. In the context of our research, the
industrial designers may have done well due to a combination of high spatial,
mental animation, and mechanical reasoning abilities. This could account for
our finding that the industrial designers did well when using Strategy B Task 1
(mentally developing inventions).
When discussing the issue of mentally developing an invention as opposed
to using drawing as an aid, it can be argued that drawing may interfere with
processing abilities, not only because of rapidly changing conceptualisations as
discussed earlier, but also because of a loss of clarity of an overall concept due
to a subject breaking down a concept into 'chunks' they can comprehend.
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Returning to the concept of 'chunking', described in the visual reasoning
research of Gattis and Holyoak (1996), if the subjects in our study are
considered to be 'chunking' the inventions, then 'running' the mental models to
verify constraints {investigating corresponding conceptual relations}, as in
Strategy B Task 1 (mentally developing inventions), the act of drawing
{external visual representations}, as in Strategy A Task 1 (Drawing to develop
inventions) may inhibit the subjects. They may be breaking down the
conceptualisations in a piecemeal fashion in order to draw it, thus interfering
with the clarity of the overall concept. Hegarty and Sims (1994), in their visual
reasoning research, argued that subjects might break down the process of
mentally animating complex systems (i.e. mentally animating an invention) into
the animation of individual components. If this is true, the lack of
understanding of the bigger 'picture' may lead to an impractical invention. That
is to say, if the subject cannot envisage the whole invention 'running', due to a
lack of visual spatial abilities, then practicality issues may remain unresolved.
In addition, from a creativity standpoint, drawing may channel the thinking of a
subject into only a few directions (the subject may be relying on emergence to
occur), causing the search space for solutions to be smaller, thereby limiting
creative ideas. Whereas, quickly mentally modelling whole inventions and
'running' them holistically, may allow for an understanding of a greater
number of creativity judgments and practicality issues which need to be
reviewed/resolved. As Athavanker's subjects put it 'they became more fluent
with their ideas' when blindfolded. This is consistent with our findings and
Strategy B Task 1 (mentally developing inventions).
The findings of this study have implications for both the design and visual
reasoning research, in that when confronted with ill-defined problems mentally
conceptualising and reasoning though those types of problems is more
beneficial than using drawing in the early phases of the design process, the
result expected from the typical view of visual reasoning. However, this is not
to say that drawing is not important, just it may be that when drawing is used, is
the important factor in visual reasoning.
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PREFACE
Design is the precursor to the construction and production of society's diverse array of artifacts.
Artifacts contribute significantly to the quality of the physical, mental, and cultural lives of the
members of a society. Given the pervasiveness of artifacts, their design and manufacture have
economic as well as cultural importance. Designers are highly trained. Even so, many designs
fall short. Increasing the effectiveness of design processes, especially by facilitating innovation,
could make significant contributions to the quality of design with consequent effects on quality of
life.
For these reasons, design has become the focus of intense research efforts. This research has
identified the conceptual stage of design as critical for both functional and innovative design.
Of central importance at this stage is the interplay between two types of knowledge: abstract,
conceptual knowledge and perceptually-based knowledge. Visuospatial reasoning is the cognitive
process that links these two types of knowledge. This aspect of the design process forms the
focus of this conference series.
We know that design entails visuospatial imagining, sketching and reasoning, but we are only
now learning in detail how this happens. It is this knowledge that will provide insights to
promote creative design through productive interaction with sketches. At its core, design is a
cognitive process. Both designers and cognitive scientists have special but different insights into
the design process. This conference brings together these two communities, those who have been
studying the design process with those who have been studying visuospatial thinking with the
goal of finding ways to facilitate design. The results of this conference are likely to have
implications for the facilitation of visuospatial reasoning in other contexts as well: in constructing
and understanding maps, diagrams, graphs, interfaces, and art as well as the many other visual
messages that are ubiquitous today.
This, the proceedings of the Second International Conference on Visual and Spatial Reasoning
in Design, contains 20 papers that span the range of research from the psychological to the
computational. More than twice that number of papers was submitted; each paper was reviewed
by three referees. The authors come from 9 different countries attesting to the spread of interest
in this burgeoning field.
The support of the Key Centre of Design Computing and Cognition of the University of
Sydney, the Rockefeller Foundation, and the Bellagio Conference Center in organizing this
conference is gratefully acknowledged as is the assistance of the Office of Naval Research
International Field Office. Anne Christian worked tirelessly to unify the multifarious
interpretations of what were thought to be clear formatting instructions to produce a coherent
volume.
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PREFACE
Design is the precursor to the construction and production of society's
diverse array of artifacts. Artifacts contribute significantly to the quality
of the physical, mental, and cultural lives of the members of a society.
Given the pervasiveness of artifacts, their design and manufacture have
economic as well as cultural importance. Designers are highly trained.
Even so, many designs fall short. Increasing the effectiveness of design
processes, especially by facilitating innovation, could make significant
contributions to the quality of design with consequent effects on quality
of life.
For these reasons, design has become the focus of intense research
efforts. This research has identified the conceptual stage of design as
critical for both functional and innovative design. Of central
importance at this stage is the interplay between two types of knowledge:
abstract, conceptual knowledge and perceptually-based knowledge.
Visuospatial reasoning is the cognitive process that links these two types
of knowledge. This aspect of the design process forms the focus of this
conference series.
We know that design entails visuospatial imagining, sketching and
reasoning, but we are only now learning in detail how this happens. It is
this knowledge that will provide insights to promote creative design
through productive interaction with sketches. At its' core, design is a
cognitive process. Both designers and cognitive scientists have special
but different insights into the design process. This conference brings
together those communities, those who have been studying the design
process with those who have been studying visuospatial thinking with the
goal of finding ways to facilitate design. The results of this conference
are likely to have implications for the facilitation of visuospatial
reasoning in other contexts as well: in constructing and understanding
maps, diagrams, graphs, interfaces, and art as well as the many other
visual messages that are ubiquitous today.
This, the proceedings of the Second International Conference on
Visual and Spatial Reasoning in Design, contains 20 papers that span the
range of research from the psychological to the computational. More
than twice that number of papers was submitted; each paper was reviewed
by three referees. The authors come from 9 different countries attesting
to the spread of interest in this burgeoning field.
The support of the Key Centre of Design Computing and Cognition
of the University of Sydney, the Rockefeller Foundation, and the
Bellagio Conference Center in organizing this conference is gratefully
